This paper shows that Physics is very close to the substitutiondiffusion paradigm of symmetric ciphers. Based on this analogy, we propose a new cryptographic algorithm. Statistical Physics gives design principles to devise fast, scalable and secure encryption systems. In particular, increasing space dimension and considering larger data blocks improve both speed and security, allowing us to reach high throughput (larger than 10Gb/s on dedicated HW). The physical approach enlarges the way to look at cryptography and is expected to bring new tools and concepts to better understand and quantify security aspects.
Introduction
Symmetric cryptography consists in transforming a plain text message M into a cipher text M ′ through a series of operations that can be inverted by the recipient of the encoded text. The transformation is specified by a secret key K which is shared by the sender and the receiver (see fig. 1 ) This transformation is usually considered in a purely mathematical framework, with no reference to any physical process. Yet, Shannon [8, 9] describes the generic steps of a cryptosystem in terms of the repetition of diffusion and confusion operations (see fig. 1 . Diffusion is a well known physical process whose microscopical origin may be associate with random walk. It seems smallest possible error we could make in this reversing process will prevent the system to evolve back to its initial state. Therefore, errors are an efficient way to prevent message decryption. Provided that we could control them, errors thus offer a way to implement a secrete key.
Fortunately, we can export the above ideas in a framework where both macroscopical irreversibility and microscopical reversibility co-exist. This is the field of discrete physics exemplified by the so-called Lattice-Gas-Automata (LGA) approach described in section 2. In a discrete physical world, one can act on each particle with full accuracy, allowing us to run the system forward and backward in time and to add well controlled errors.
This paper is organized as follows: we first define the LGA paradigm and illustrate its behavior with respect to the second principle of thermodynamics. Then we propose a complete cryptographic algorithm based of the LGA approach in which Physics naturally suggests simple and efficient operations, as well as a criteria to generalize the algorithm to a wide range of topologies and sizes. We provide some evidence of the security (evolution of Hamming distance, flatness of XOR table, computational effort to break the key with differential cryptography). We finally conclude by insisting on the deep and promising link that exist between physics and cryptography.
Discrete physics and Lattice-gas Automata
Lattice-gas automata (LGA) are a special class of cellular automata (CA) designed to provide a mesoscopic model of a physical system, such as a gas or a fluid [1] .
LGA can be thought of as a virtual universe implementing a fully discrete abstraction of the real world. Technically speaking, these automata consist of a N point-particles moving on a regular lattice in d spatial dimensions, according to a discrete time steps. The possible velocities of each particle are restricted by the lattice topology in the sense that, in one time step ∆t, a particle move from one site to one of its existing neighbor. Thus, if z is the lattice coordination number, particles may have z possible velocities denoted v i , i = 1, ..., z. Figure 2 illustrates the situation.
Let us denote by n i ( r, t) the number of particles entering lattice site r at time t with velocity v i . Assuming that these particles are not deflected at site r, they will, at the next time step, enter the neighboring site pointed by v i , with the same velocity. In other words, n i ( r + v i ∆t, t + ∆t) = n i ( r, t). This operation is called propagation and can be globally described by an operator P . If M(t) is a configuration of particles over the full lattice, then M(t + ∆t) = P M(t) Figure 2 : An example of a LGA, the so-called FHP model [3] defined on a hexagonal lattice where each site has z = 6 neighbors.
represents the motion of all particles at every sites. Note that if the lattice is not periodic in all direction, a special treatment is required for the particles reaching the spatial boundaries.
We shall now assume that n i can be either 0 or 1 (no particle, or at most one with velocity v i at site r and time t). Also, we assume that the particles entering the same site at the same time from different direction (i.e. different velocities) interact according to a pre-defined collision rule. The result of this collision is to create new particles in some directions and to remove some particles in other directions, as illustrated in fig. 2 .
The collision process can be described by functions C i (n 1 , n 2 , ..., n z ), i = 1, ..., z, taking the value 1 if the interaction produces a particle with velocity v i and 0 otherwise. After the collision, the particles move to one of their neighboring site, according to the velocity they have. Thus
The fact that C i can be either 0 or 1 guarantees that the occupation numbers n i obey our hypothesis of being 0 or 1 at all times and all lattice positions. Therefore, the full dynamics can be described by a set of z bits of information at each lattice site and each time steps. As before, we can consider that C is an operator which acts on all lattice sites. Thus if M(t) is the configuration at time t, eq. 1 becomes
where P is the propagation operator. Now, if we want our Boolean particles to behave macroscopically as observed in a real physical system, the collision operator C must be carefully chosen. Its expression will crucially depends on the nature of the physical process. For instance, it can be shown that, in the appropriate macroscopic limit, fluid motion can be reproduced by such a LGA. This is the case of the famous FHP model (2d) or FCHC models (3d) (see [1] ) which can be shown to obey the Navier-Stokes equation of hydrodynamics. The proof of this equivalence is mathematically rather involved [1] . Intuitively, the LGA is a caricature of the microscopic level but, at a macroscopic level, it behaves as a real system. Over the past decade, this property has been intensively exploited by many researchers to develop a new generation of hydrodynamics solvers, such as the so-called Lattice Boltzmann method which keeps gaining in popularity to model and simulate complex fluids.
When using this physical framework to build a cryptographic system one property of direct importance is time reversibility. For a classical physical system of particle, e.g. a fluid, it is well known that, by modifying the velocity of each particle from v to −v, but keeping the same evolution equation, the full system retrace its own past. For several reason, this time-reversal operation is out of reach in real systems and also in standard molecular dynamics simulations. First, one needs to access all the degrees of freedom and, second, one must know to infinite precision the actual value of the velocity. Finally, in the case of a computer model, the calculation should not produce the slightest numerical error.
However, in the case of a LGA model, reversing time is possible because both the particles and the dynamics are Boolean. Calculations are done with full accuracy, without truncations or errors. We illustrate this behavior in fig. 3 . When no errors are introduced, it is possible to reverse the velocity of each particle by applying, at a chosen time t, the reverse operator R at each lattice site and we see the system return to its initial state after t repetition of propagation P and collision C.
The operator R permutes the value of the n i at each site so as to place a particle of speed v i the − v i direction. Therefore
For instance, in the case of a lattice with four directions (North, East, South, and West), R would swap East with West and North with South. In this case R(n 1 , n 2 , n 3 , n 4 ) = (n 3 , n 4 , n 1 , n 2 )
where
An interesting relation between P and R is
which means that reversing allows the particle to propagate in the direction they came from and reach it with opposite velocity (which is the reason why P RP = R and not P RP = 1). The reversibility of the collision operator means
because reversing the post collision configuration and applying the collision again give the pre-collision state, but with opposite velocities. With P RP = R and CRC = R one has
which shows that performing r iterations, reversing the velocity and performing again r iterations take us back to the initial configuration, with all particles having an opposite velocity. This proves the time-reversibility of the process. The time-reversal operation is possible because the system has, in fact, not forgotten about its initial condition (in fig. 3 all particles are in the left compartment) even though it evolves to a state where this information seems completely lost. The information is actually not lost but diluted on all degrees of freedom. Therefore, if one perturbs just a single piece of this distributed information, the system loses its capability to evolve back to its past. This is shown in fig. 4 where a particle has been artificially added before reversing the time. Clearly, all the particles whose trajectory have been directly or indirectly affected by the presence of this extra particle are unable to return to their original position. This single modification creates an avalanche of perturbations which expands further and further as the number of time steps increased. This experiment illustrates how in a LGA paradigm we can play with the second principle of thermodynamics and reverse the arrow of time. At the macroscopic level, an H-theorem can be proved (provided that C is properly chosen), meaning the an entropy can be defined and that it always ends up growing. At the microscopic level, however, past and future are fully equivalent provided one has full knowledge of all degrees of freedom of the system.
Another point worth mentioning about LGA is its intrinsic parallelism. All the particles move synchronously on the lattice and can be updated at the same time. The large degree of parallelism present in physical systems is naturally reproduced here and can be exploited to speedup dramatically the simulation. The collision operation is embarrassingly parallel whereas the propagation requires regular collective communications.
A new cryptography algorithm
In this section we make explicit the link we claimed to exist between classical symmetric cryptographic algorithms and a LGA-fluid. Then we propose a new cryptographic algorithm which exploits this physical analogy and we discuss the properties of such an approach.
Standard symmetric block-cipher
Symmetric cryptography (as opposed to public-key cryptography) assumes that prior to the exchange of the encoded message, the sender and the recipient have agreed on a secret key which is used, on one side to encode the plain text message and, on the other side to decode it.
Block-ciphers (as opposed to stream-ciphers) consider that the information that need to be transmitted can be divided into blocks of, say, N bits. Each block is encoded by the algorithm and sent before the next block is processed.
Symmetric cryptosystems are usually described as a combination of two operations, termed diffusion and confusion [8, 9] These operations are repeated in alternance and iteratively on the message M to be encoded. Each application of the diffusion and confusion step is called a round. Thus the full process consists in applying r rounds on message M. The larger the value of r, the more secure the encoding but the slower the encryption process.
In practice, confusion is achieved by transforming each byte b of M according to a substitution box, or S-box, which is a given invertible, non-linear function. Diffusion corresponds to a deterministic shuffling of the bytes across the full message.
Following Kirckhof principle, the secrecy of the process is not obtained by keeping hidden the algorithm but by parameterizing some of its aspects by a secret key K, made up of N ′ bits only known to the communicating persons. A common strategy is to XOR the key bits with the message bits before each round. In order to improve the security of the encoding process, the bits of the key are not reused identically over all rounds. They are transformed after each round, for instance by applying the same diffusion-confusion process as used for the message itself. These new sets of bits obtained at each round are called r ound keys.
Note that, in some ciphers, the secret key K is used to parametrized the S-box rather than being a secret, dynamic mask.
Quite often, the key size N ′ matches the block size N. When the key is smaller than the message, padding is necessary. This can be a security issue if these additional bit are not carefully chosen. When the key is larger than the message, the extra key bits can be used to produce the successive round keys. When the entire message is composed of several blocks, the final round key of block i is usually used as the first round key for block i + 1. Once the recipient has received all blocks, decoding can start by inverting the ciphering process. For this purpose, the recipient must compute the final round key.
The above general discussion applies to well known cryptographic algo-rithms such as DES. AES, IDEA [7, 2] 3.2 A physically based cryptography algorithm
By comparing the material of sections 2 and 3.1, we clearly see how the LGAfluid bears structural similarities with the classical block-cipher engines.
The plain text message (block) corresponds to the initial configuration of the physical particles (one bit is the presence or absence of a particle), the S-box is the collision process and diffusion is obtained by our propagation. The r rounds represent a time evolution (iterations) and decoding reflects time-reversal invariance. The role of the key is a bit less obvious but it can be thought of as a controlled error which is added to break the possibility to reverse time. Somehow, the round keys reproduce the space-time evolution of a secret configuration of particles that interact with the "message" particles.
However, some specificities of the physical process need to be emphasized with respect to the classical cryptographic algorithms.
Space dimension Our particles move in a two-dimensional space. The dynamics can be generalized to higher dimensions. Usually, in cryptography the concept of space is absent, or little exploited (AES uses a matrix formulation which is more a mathematical construct than the desire to embed the process in the physical space). In physics, it is known that higher dimensional spaces allows for more efficient mixing mechanisms and reduces the space diameter.
Fine grain diffusion In the LGA model, particles are mixed across space through the propagation process. Its purpose is to dilute the information carried by the initial configuration on all degrees of freedom. This "diffusion"
1 takes place at a bit level, whereas it is usually made a byte level in standard cryptography.
Collision Like a S-box, collision is a local operation since it is repeated independently over all lattice sites. It can be implemented as a lookup table and acts upon z bits where z is the lattice coordination number. Thus, depending on the lattice topology, collision acts on pieces of information that can be smaller, larger or equal to a byte. In the discrete-fluid, C is reversible, that is the same function is used forward in time or backward in time. This is a significant simplification when hardware implementation is considered. On the other hand, in a physical model, the collision C may have some undesired properties with respect to cryptography. In our fluid example, the number of particles is conserved by C (because Nature does). These conservations laws must be removed when devising a cryptographic scheme.
Scalability and parallelism The LGA fluid is composed of the juxtaposition of many identical units: the lattice cell. In addition, these lattice cells are locally connected according to a simple topology. Therefore, system of arbitrary size can be constructed with the same design principle and same simplicity. The locality of the collision and the regularity of the diffusion allows for massive parallelism (one processing element at each lattice site, for any lattice size).
The above discussion shows that classical mechanics, in the flavor of a discrete physical system (LGA or CA model), offers a natural framework for designing a cryptographic device. It actually resembles the classical designs obtained from mathematical principles but has some interesting features: cipher of any size can be produced with the same design principle, in which parallelism is ensured. Moreover, simplicity, regularity and adequation of the 2D physical space with the spatial layout of integrated circuits allows fast hardware implementation.
A specific instance of the algorithm
We can now define more precisely an instance of a cryptographic algorithm based on the physics analogy. We consider a 2D square lattice, with z = 8 links (up, left, right, down, plus the four diagonals) as illustrated in fig. 5 . In the LGA jargon, this topology is often referred to as D2Q8 (2 Dimensions, 8 Quantities). The lattice is a square of size N/z × N/z, with periodic boundaries. Each site contains z = 8 bits (i.e. a byte) and the full lattice can encrypt a block M of N bits. The propagation P and reverse operator R are as described in section 2: each of the eight bits of a given site is moved to one of the eight neighbors of that site and R swaps the bits traveling in opposite direction.
In order to build a collision which is reversible (i.e CRC = R), but has no other symmetries, we first build a random, self-inverse function
To produce C ′ one has to define the image j = C ′ (i) for all i = 0, 1, ...2 z − 1. We start with i = 0 and choose j at random. Then we immediately set Figure 5 : The 2D lattice used in the Crystal algorithm. Here, a system of size 8 × 8 is shown. Each gray box contain 8 bits so that the full block has 512 bits. Here we assume a periodic topology: left and right borders are wrap around, as well as the upper and lower ones. C ′ (j) = i to ensure idempotency. We then proceeds similarly with the next i for which the image or pre-image has not yet been computed. The operator C ′ obtained in this way can be further tested if needed to ensure that has no accidental undesired features. The function C = C ′ R is then published as part of the algorithm
The secret key K has N ′ bits. We assume that N ′ ≤ N. If N ′ < N some padding is needed. We produce the N − N ′ remaining bits by applying for instance the Kirkpatrick-Stoll procedure [5] to build random bit with density 1/2 out of an initial set: b ℓ = b ℓ−250 ⊕ b ℓ−103 which can always be applied if N ′ ≥ 250. Note that lagged Fibonacci method [4] can also be used:
Then the round key at iteration m is obtained by successive application of P C over the previous round key at iteration m − 1. Finally the round keys are combined with the iterated message with an XOR.
In order to ensure that the encryption and decryption are completely identical, it is convenient to start the process by a reverse and a propagation steps. This gives the following algorithm (whose structure remain the same even with a different topology)
where XOR is the same as ⊕ and K refers to the padded key. In appendix A, it is demonstrated that this scheme is reversible, namely that if (
. The appropriate value of the number of round r is discussed later.
Properties
In this section we derive some important properties of our cryptographic algorithm. The results will show that we can encrypt large blocks of data by taking a large enough lattice. We will show that this process increases both throughput and security.
Hamming distance
First we consider the number r of iterations needed to make two initial messages M 1 and M 2 as different as possible from each other. We assume that messages M 1 and M 2 are identical except for one bit. The speed at which these two initial conditions diverge from each other reflects the discrete Lyapounov exponent of the dynamics. The question is to determine how many steps are necessary so that the single bit error has "polluted" the full system. From that point on, all degrees of freedom have been informed that the two message actually differ.
Since the key evolves similarly in the two messages, it is irrelevant and can be omitted from the discussion. After each collision-propagation step, information propagates away from the initial source of error. For the D2Q8 topology we discuss here, it is easy to show that the number of sites that can be reached from an initial lattice position grows with the number of round r as a square shaped region A(r) of side 2r + 1 (and of area (2r + 1)
2 ). This relation simply reflects that, at round r +1, all lattice sites that are bordering A(r) according to the D2Q8 topology will belong to A(r + 1).
Thus, when (2r + 1) 2 = N/z, all the sites are informed. This value of r = (1/2) N/z corresponds to the diameter d of the lattice. Since there are z bits per sites and two random patterns differ on average by half of their bits, the Hamming distance between M 1 and M 2 after r steps is expected to ideally evolve as Figure 6 shows the evolution of the normalized Hamming distance h(r, M 1 , M 2 ) = H/N in the case of our algorithm. We observe that, essentially, a number r = √ 2d is needed to reach the plateau h = 1/2 where each bit of the two configurations differ randomly. Thus, fluctuations of magnitude 1/ √ N around the value 1/2 are expected. The speed at which the h = 1/2 plateau is reached is less than predicted by eq. 6 because after a collision (or substitution), only about z/2 bits differ from the reference configuration. As shown in fig. 7 , the error thus propagates as a disk and not a square. The diameter of that error-disk grows on average by one lattice site at each iteration. Thus, during the first r = N/z/2, H behaves as Comparison with the ideal curve (eq. 6 is given with the doted parabola. The solid line parabola is the theoretical estimate of eq. 7). Finally, the vertical line show the iteration at which, according to eq. 8, the plateau should be reached. When the error disk has reach the boundary of the lattice, the Hamming distance grows slower. A few more steps are needed to reach the corner of the domain. Assuming that the radius of the disk keep growing at speed 1, the total number of iterations is equal to half the length of the diagonal, i.e.
This is the minimal number of rounds needed to mix the information all over the system. We will argue below that more rounds may be needed to ensure more security against cryptanalysis. Thus we write r = αd where α is some constant. In the case of a D2Q8 lattice, we obtain
Throughput and security
Let us assume that the number of rounds is r = α N/z, as discussed in the previous section. If the process is fully parallelized, propagation and collision take a constant time, t pc . Then the time T needed to encrypt the N bits of the message is T = t pc r = t pc α N/z (10) Therefore, the encryption throughput W is
Thus, when large data blocks are encrypted and full parallelism is implemented, the throughput increases, even though the number of round also increases. However, the number of round increases slower than the data size. On the other hand, when the same N bits are split in several smaller blocks (as is the case with standard cryptosystems), the total throughput is that obtained with one block and does not increase. On large enough data set, our approach, with full parallelism, will always give a better performance. Estimate shows that for N = 2048, a throughput of 10 Gb/s is expected with a FPGA implementation. Note that, the hardware simplicity of our cipher makes it possible to obtain high throughput even on small data sets.
Security is also improved by our approach. Indeed, it is well admitted that the main factor impacting security in a symmetric block cipher is the number of rounds. In our case, the number of round increases as N grows, making the cipher more resistant to cryptanalytic attacks. Thus security is improved at the same time as throughput increases.
In the next section we give an estimate of the difficulty to break our algorithm when differential cryptanalysis is used.
5 Differential cryptanalysis
Introduction
As already mentioned, a cryptosystem is a recipe to transform of a plain text message M of N bits into another message M ′ , also containing N bits. Since the process must be invertible in order to achieve decryption, the transformation must be a permutation from the set M N of all N-bit messages into itself. The secret key K can then be seen as parameter which selects one of the possible permutation.
With N bits, there are 2 N possible messages and (2 N )! possible permutations. This is by far too large a number to use all possible permutations. That would require very long keys (with log 2 (2 N !) ≈ (N −1)2 N bits) to index all of them.
Therefore, in practice, a cryptosystem is a subset of the possible permutations from M N → M N , with a well specified indexing scheme to properly associate each key with each accessible permutation. Typically, K has also N bits and can index 2 N permutations only. Obviously the relation between the key and the permutation is not explicit and is hidden by the algorithm which tells how to compute M ′ from M and K. The task of cryptanalysis is to obtain information on the secret key K from the knowledge of some pairs (M, M ′ ). In the case where all (2 N )! permutations are possible, the knowledge of (M, M ′ ) gives little information on the chosen permutation, hence on the value of K. Indeed, if (M, M ′ ) belongs to the secret permutation, there are still (2 N − 1)! permutations to search for.
The other extreme is given by the following very simple cryptosystem:
This is a rather trivial indexing scheme since K is immediately determined by (M, for i = 1, 2. By XORing the above relation for i = 1 and i = 2 and applying inverse propagation, we obtain
Complexity to break the Crystal algorithm
It is now convenient to introduced F −1 , an inverse XOR function associated with C. Suppose that
for some known z-bit value b and unknown z-bit values a 1 and a 2 . The question is to know which pairs a 1 and a 2 can possibly produce the given b. More specifically and for reasons that will become clear in a moment, we want to know the value of a 1 ⊕ a 2 compatible with b. So we write
For a given collision operator C, F −1 can be computed by exhaustive search. In practice one has to generate all possible values of a = a 1 ⊕ a 2 and compute what b = C(a 1 ) ⊕ C(a 2 ) it produces. Since we consider z-bit values, there are 2 z ways to choose a and 2 z possible values for b. Therefore, F −1 can be represented as a 2 z × 2 z matrix. A zero element at position (a, b) in this matrix means that the corresponding b cannot be produced with the corresponding a. Non-zero elements are set to the number of pairs (a 1 , a 2 ) such that C(a 1 ) ⊕ C(a 2 ) = b and a 1 ⊕ a 2 = a. Indeed, a given b can be obtained several times with the same a, since each a can be produced from 2 z combinations a 1 ⊕ a 2 , where a 1 is free and a 2 = a ⊕ a 1 . Therefore, the sum of each row of the matrix is 2 z . Similarly, each column also sums up to 2 z . To see it, assume that b is written as
z such values of b 1 . As C is invertible, we can compute
By normalizing each entry with 2 z , one obtains a matrix whose rows and columns sum up to 1. An example for z = 4 and our procedure to build a random reversible C is given below. For instance, the element 1/8 obtained for a = 4 and b = 7 means that if b = 7, the probability that a = 4 is 1/8. Clearly, if a = 0, it means that a 1 = a 2 and thus b = C(a 1 ) ⊕ C(a 2 ) = 0, and conversely.
We can now come back to eq. 13. With definition 14, we can rewrite it as
By repeating this relation recursively, one obtain
where r is the number of rounds. Below we will show that if M
is known to the attacker, it is rather easy to obtain the secret key K. The question we want to investigate first is how much computational effort is required to obtain M
which, by hypothesis, is known since attackers are supposed to have access to any pairs (M, M ′ ) they want. The estimate of the complexity of finding M
differ over all N/z lattice sites. In order to perform the backward scheme indicated in eq. 15, one has to find all possible pre-images by
. Empirically we observe that the number of pre-image of a given b is larger than 2 z /4. Of course this depends on the choice of C, but this seems to be a minimal value. Therefore, for each lattice site, at least 2 z−2 values are possible for M
. This requires to select (N/z)2 z−2 candidates for M
. The same argument can be repeated r − d times. After that, we can quickly exclude some possibilities. Indeed, at this point, we know that the error has not been able to propagate up to the outer boundary of the lattice. For these lattice sites,
must be zero. Thus the number of sites for which the exploration continues is ( N/z −2)
2 . If we undo one more step, even more possibilities can be excluded and the pre-images of "only" ( N/z − 4) 2 sites must be investigated. Following this idea for the d − 1 steps, one has to explore 3
each with 2 z /4 = 2 (z−2) possible values. An inferior bound for this number is (see appendix B)
Thus, in total (undoing the rounds beyond and below the diameter) implies to investigate
candidates for M
2 . This relation will be discuss in detail in section 5.4. Some values of N as a function of N and r are given in table 1.
The last step to obtain the key
In this section, we show how to compute the key from a possible candidate M
2 for a D2Q8 topology
. The quantity b is supposed to be known. We now investigate all possible values of b 1 = 0, 1, ...(2 z − 1). For each of these b 1 , b 2 can be computed as
Since C is invertible, we can compute from the definition of b 1
Thus, from the definition of b 2
Consequently, the initial key K (0) must satisfy
If
2 , then another choice of b 1 must be considered. Otherwise, the value of K (0) obtained from eq. 19 is a possible key value.
The time complexity of this last step is thus 2 z .
Security and performance
Let us now analyze in more detail eq. 17. We write N as N = 2 ℓ , where ℓ = log 2 N. For z = 8 = 2 3 , eq. 17 becomes
where r > d and d = (1/2) N/z = 2 (ℓ−5)/2 . Some values of N, r and N are shown in table 1. Note that the size N = 32 is only given to illustrate how r changes when the block size increases or decreases. Clearly, with 32-bit messages, all messages M could be generated to discover which one encrypts to a given, intercepted M ′ . In this case, no complex cryptanalysis would be necessary.
Some remarks about the throughput are now in order. With a parallel hardware, the encryption time grows as the number of rounds but it is independent of N. Thus, throughput clearly benefits from large N, as the throughput is proportional to N and inversely proportional to r. In the examples shown in table 1, we see that N = 512 yields the best throughput while keeping about the same cryptanalytic complexity. This effect is mostly lost on a sequential hardware, since computing time goes as r × N and the throughput is the block size divided by the computing time. Thus, throughput is proportional to 1/r. Therefore, for a given value of N , since r increases as N decreases, larger sizes offer a better throughput. However, it may be argued that a software implementation of our algorithm on small system size can be significantly faster. For instance, for N = 32, four table lookups of 256 entries are enough on a 32-bit architecture to perform both the propagation and the collision on the entire system. For N = 128, 48 table lookups become necessary to implement at once collision and propagation. Thus, for the same cryptanalytic complexity, blocks of 32 bits would provide a throughput about 10 times larger than blocks of 128 bits.
In order to summarize the above discussion and to highlight the link between security and performance in a parallel implementation, let us define the security measure S as the logarithm of our estimate of N S = log 2 N = (ℓ + 3)r − 6d + 4
We also define the throughput per clock tick, Q, as
where the clock tick is defined as the time needed to perform one round of encryption.
In figure 8 (a) , we show how r must change with respect to N, for a given security level S. We have from eq. 20
so that, for each value of N (i.e for the corresponding values of d and ℓ), we can plot the value of r ensuring the security S. Note that, the constraint r > d must be satisfied. From eq. 22 we also obtain the isosecurity relation between Q and N. This is shown in figure 8 (b) . We see that for a clock rate of 100 MHz, a throughput of 50Gb/s is achieved for a block of size N = 8192 bits.
Finally, in figure 9 (a) we show how security S increases with N when we take the number of round r as twice the diameter d. In figure 9 (b) we plot Q, the resulting throughput per clock cycle.
conclusion
We have shown that discrete physics offers a natural and inspiring framework to analyze symmetric cryptographic algorithms based of the diffusionconfusion paradigm. Physical concepts such as entropy, ergodicity, thermodynamic limits, mixing, Liapounov exponent, etc are alternative ways to describe and quantify cryptographic devices and security issues.
The analogy with discrete physics provides us with simple design principles to devise families of highly scalable encryption algorithms, as discussed in detail in the present paper and exemplified with the so-called Crystal algorithm. A key feature of our approach is that the encryption of large data blocks is possible with parallel hardware. It results in a higher throughput and a higher security. In a time where new applications develop and require the fast encryption of large volume of data, our approach is a very promising solution to several emerging technologies
A Reversibility of the encryption-decryption algorithm
We here prove that the decryption and encryption schemes are actually identical.
The encryption algorithm consists of n rounds of adding the key to the message and performing a collision operation followed by a propagation step. The last round terminates with the addition of the current value of the key again. The key itself evolves simply with n rounds of collision-propagation operations.
We propose to write the full algorithm as
As a consequence, the decryption will follow the exact same steps. We sketch the proof below.
Let M and K be the initial message and key. After the first application of reverse and propagation operator, it is convenient to define
Let M (m) be the message after m rounds and K (m) the current key value at these m rounds. With P and C the propagation and collision operators, the above encryption rule reads 
where m = 1, 2, ..., n − 1. After the last round, we add the key one more time and we have
In order to show that, by applying the same steps a second time, the message gets decrypted, we need to derive the following relations:
P RM
(n−1) = P C P RM (n) ⊕ P RK (n) ⊕ P RK 
The proof of the above three relations is now given. From eq. 25 we obtain
where R is the reverse operator, which is linear: R(a ⊕ b) = Ra ⊕ Rb. By applying a propagation to both side of eq. 29 we obtain
because P is linear and P RP = R. We can now apply C on both side and, since CRC = R, our equation becomes
where, again we have used the linearity of R. This equation can be rewritten as
or, after applying P P RM (n−1) = P C P RM (n) ⊕ P RK (n) ⊕ P RK These last equations prove eqs. (27) and (28). Now we can apply our encryption algorithm a second time on M (n) and K (n) and show that it gives back M and K. The result of the first reverse and propagate operation gives P RM (n) and P RK (n) . Now let us write the result of the first iteration. Key addition plus collision and propagation yield P C P RM (n) ⊕ P RK (n) , P CP RK (n)
Using relations (26) and (28), this reduces to P RM (n−1) ⊕ P RK (n−1) , P RK
(n−1)
The next iteration starts by adding the current key, namely P RK (n−1) . Thus the message now reads
Then follows a collision-propagation step on both the message and the key P CP RM (n−1) , P CP RK
Equations (27) and (28) can now be applied for m = n − 1 and produce P RM (n−2) ⊕ P RK (n−2) , P RK (n−2)
The next n − 2 rounds work similarly and yield P RM (0) ⊕ P RK (0) , P RK
The final key addition (after the n rounds) give
This achieves the proof that the decryption is identical to the encryption since the original message M is recovered.
B Calculation of an inferior bound of Q r
Let us define Q r = 1 × 3 × 5... × (2r + 1)
This quantity can be written as Q r = (2r + 1)! 2 r r! Thus, using Stirling formula, one has:
ln Q r = ln(2r + 1)! − r ln 2 − ln r! = (2r + 1) ln(2r + 1) − (2r + 1) − r ln 2 − r ln r + r ≥ 2r ln(2r) − 2r − 1 − r ln 2 − r ln r + r = 2r ln 2 + 2r ln r − r − 1 − r ln 2 − r ln r = r ln 2 + r ln r − r − 1 = r ln 2 + r ln(2r/2) − r − 1 = r ln 2 + r ln 2 + r ln(r/2) − r − 1 = r(2 ln 2 − 1) + r ln(r/2) − 1 ≥ r ln(r/2) which is the quantity of interest to bound the amount of work for a differential cryptanalysis of our algorithm.
